Complicating the Anti-Defamation League

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The Cover of the book The Anti-Defamation League and the Racial State by Emmaia Gelman

I recently read a piece by Anna Snyder with the wonderful title, “Why Do Historians Complicate Things?” The job of the historian is to capture the fullness of the past, after all and the past is a complicated place. Our job is to try to capture some of those complications and explain their relevance to the present. As a historian who spent his entire academic career outside a history department I identified with her statement, “We are, professionally speaking, difficult people to the majority of those outside the discipline.” Someone can only hear, “It depends.” or “It is more complicated than that.” so many times, after all.

One sentence jumped out at me: “We write entire articles to explain why a term meant something slightly different in 1849 than it did in 1850.” More than two decades ago an editor for a major publisher told me how he was frustrated in trying to get historians to write general books: “I hear things like ‘I only really know about 1942.'” Ouch.

The take away message is that “when historians are interpreting the past for non-academic audiences, we must complicate without the help of lengthy discursive footnotes. Doing this effectively and responsibly is a matter of civic importance.” I love this. History is important, dammit! We need to be able to make it important for everyone. Yes, yes getting the facts right is important but so is making the past relevant. We don’t write history “for the sake of the past.” Julius Caesar is dead and gone, we can’t do anything for his sake. We write for each other and “each other” does not only include other historians. If we are lucky enough to have anyone read what we write, we’d better make it count for them.

This bring me to Emmaia Gelman‘s new book, The Anti-Defamation League and the Racial State. Gelman is the founding director of the Institute for the Critical Study of Zionism. Gelman is not setting out to write a complete history of the ADL because it is far to large a topic and “I did not have access to the ADL’s in-house archives” (p. 15). I sympathize with both caveats as I have not been able to access those archives either even though I asked nicely.

The book is based on a critical perspective that “sets out to discern how power produces the seemingly natural conditions in which it operates, and to comprehend and resist the violence of those operations” (p. 14). I have a great deal of sympathy with this perspective. My work on scientific racism can be described in a similar fashion: the supposed “objectivity” of racist science naturalizes human differences and has justified all kinds oppression and violence.

Gelman is interested in the ADL as a political institution. Granting that the people working for the ADL have accomplished worthwhile things, “challenging housing discrimination to infiltrating White Citizen Councils , some people working for the ADL have taken risky stands and made substantial dents in material injustice” (p. 15). Those accomplishments notwithstanding Gelman portrays the ADL as an elitist and conservative institution embedded in and accepting of the capitalist system of the USA. Elitist because, from its beginning in 1913, it was composed of elite German Jews who disdained recent Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe as uncultured near-savages who needed to be disciplines so as not to cast all Jews in a bad light. The first chapter, “White Settler and Immigrant Riffraff: Before World War II,” makes a very persuasive case for the ADL’s elitism.

For Gelman the ADL’s elitism overlaps with its inherently conservative politics. “Until the 1950s,” Gelman writes, “most US Jewry was working-class and far to the left of the ADL, and the ADL was anxious to distinguish itself from them” (p. 2). Thus, it embraced liberal capitalism and set itself against mass movements of the anti-capitalist left. Because true liberation requires the destruction of racial liberalism, the ADL was, and is a barrier to any anti-racist project. “I wanted to understand,” Gelman writes, “why the ADL invested so heavily in civil rights and at the same time advocated obviously racist and violent projects, including colonial violence in Palestine and also US-based projects like supporting blanket surveillance of Muslims by the New York City police department, claiming advance Jewish safety and protect democracy” (p. 16). Gelman wanted to “look for the logic that threaded them together” (p. 17).

Gelman is critical of the ADL for its move to “the vital center….[which] produced a durable bipartisan conservatism using the imperative to ‘protect civil rights and democracy’ as means of disciplining and marginalizing popular movements… It framed a return to American ideals as the antidote to fascism and war, and rejected the leftist challenges to the state and right-wing racism and religious rigidity as forms of extremism” (p. 90).

Gelman argues that to merely “follow the money…misses the dense field of personal relationships and moral authority that underwrite the ADL’s work” (p. 17). Gelman writes of “settler colonialism, Cold War imperialism, Western hegemony” in which “Zionism is only a later crystallizing expression” (p. 262). These are huge analytical categories that fail to capture the complexity of the arguments in the context of the time and, as a result, misses those dense relationships Gelman wants to unmask.

Now is the time for me to invoke those standard historians’ arguments. First, “I only know about 1942.” OK, I’ll be a little broader than that. I’m working (still!) on my book about radical capitalism in the Civil Rights Era and have a lot of views on antisemtism and the ADL in the decades following World War II. In this review I will concentrate on Chapter 2, “Red Jews, Anticolonial Arabs, Black Leftists, and Colorblind Anticommunism: The ’50s and ’60s.”

Second… well.. dammit it is complicated! Most scholars agree that how antisemitism and Anti-Zionism and the myth of “Islamic antisemitism” evolved after the Six-Day War in 1967 The two decades between the end of World War II and the Six-Day war deserve to be analyzed on their own terms. Gelman notes the shift (p. 8) in the ADL in 1974 with the book, The New Anti-Semitism. For Gelman the pro-Zionism and Islamophobia of 1974 was only a hardening of the same ideology found in the previous decades. I disagree.

The result of the turn in the late 1960s is the inexcusable position of today’s ADL defending the genocide in Gaza, which it clearly is. The question is whether or not the “logic” of the ADL’s politics that led to its position today existed decades ago? Gelman seems to think so. I want to argue that today’s ADL’s position on Zionism was a contingent outcome of choices that the ADL took later in its existence. I want to argue, in Ian Hacking’s phrase, “against inevitability.”

1. Where and What Was the Left?

Gelman’s argument largely depends on the existence of leftist alternatives to the ADL’s program of action. Gelman argues that a leftist alternative existed to the liberal capitalist regime in which the ADL operated. The book charges that the ADL attacked this genuine leftist alternative and became a conservative Cold War extension of the Federal government’s oppressive anticommunism.

Gelman argues that, after World War II, the ADL gained power and prominence in part by abandoning the Jewish political left. “As the ADL’s stature rose,” Gelman argues, “as a mainstream democracy organization, its claims to represent US Jewry gained importance, and its antipathy toward the Jewish left became more consequential.” Gelman points to the coordination among “more conservative wealthier groups” to narrow the scope of acceptable politics for the Jewish cause (p. 93). Gelman writes that the ADL enjoyed “its success in burying the Jewish left” (p. 90). Gelman’s claims here are quite strong: Jewish organizations “moved to cleanse themselves of any connection to communism and to purge the leftist whose existence they had wishfully denied…. The purges of Jewish organizations paralleled the purges of communists from their unions, as well as the excision of entire communist-led unions from labor coalitions that would also decimate the infrastructure of Jewish life.”

Gelman wants to track “The ADL’s conflicts with popular movements from below” (p. 13). While assuring the reader that the left was offering more genuine solutions to oppression, Gelman offers little description of who the left were or what they were advocating. When discussing the ADL’s shift to focus on “civil rights, racism, and egalitarianism,” Gelman assures the reader that “the left had already been organizing on those issues for decades” (p. 102). That declaration raises more questions than answers about the left: What organizations? How were they organizing? What were their arguments? Gelman discusses the dismissal of the work of Black sociologist Oliver Cox’s Marxist analysis of racism (p. 83-4, I discuss Cox here), but apart from that the reader is largely left in the dark about any leftist program of action.2

When offering evidence of a vibrant communist/leftist community of Jews in the immediate postwar years, Gelman suddenly interrupts the narrative and sends the reader back to the prewar United States describing just such a community which was, indeed, criticized by the ADL (pp. 85-88). But, as the very sources Gelman cites make clear, after the war, “the left for all intents and purposes almost withered away” (p. 309). McCarthyism and Cold War politics had something to do with it, to be sure. In the Jewish community leftist politics had always been strongest among Eastern European Jewish immigrants and racist immigration restrictions in the 1920s had cut off that immigration. American Jews were increasingly middle-class, not working class. The Communist Party of the 1930s had never been primarily composed of working class members in any case and, as social and physical mobility of American Jews increased so did the communities in which the American left flourished.

All of these demographic changes, does not mean that the postwar ADL was not hostile to leftists. It is more reasonable, however, to see that hostility as reflecting the constituency of American Jews they claimed to be representing. They followed more than they led anticommunist politics. As another source of Gelman’s notes the longevity of the ADL’s parent organization, the B’nai B’rith owes to its flexibility in responding the changing political and social circumstances. We may view that flexibility as accommodationist or unprincipled, as Gelman does. Or we may view it as a necessary response to the reality of the situation in which the ADL found itself in the postwar world.

2. The ADL and Governmental Anticommunism

Gelman argues that the ADL identified “Jewish, Black and Arab organizers as a threat to democracy” (p. 102) and claims that “The ADL’s anticommunist fervor superseded any distaste for right-wing anticommunist crusaders” (p. 96). Gelman writes of the ADL’s “Cooperation with McCarthy and his widely reviled lieutenant, Roy Cohn” (p.97). These claims are under-evidenced in the book.

In what way did the ADL cooperate with McCarthy? Gelman points to a meeting between Arnold Forster, ADL general counsel and other ADL leaders with McCarthy in December of 1951. We don’t know what happened at that meeting, but according to Gelman, it marked the beginning of cooperation between the ADL and the government red-baiting witch hunters. But a few pages earlier, Gelman argued that by 1953 the ADL classed McCarthy “into the category of disreputable demagogues” they opposed (p. 89). So any kind of collaborative activity between the ADL and McCarthy occurred in a very short time period. Within those two years, there is little evidence that the ADL played any role in assisting McCarthy.

We can agree with Gelman that governmental anti-communist investigations were abuses of governmental authority. We can agree that those investigations were based more on character assassination than genuine threats to the country. We can agree that many leftist Americans were not in thrall to the USSR. That does not mean that the examples Gelman provides of the ADL aiding those investigations show that the ADL played any significant role in the persecution of leftist Americans. Gelman’s evidence for significant collaboration between the government and the ADL is almost nonexistent.

Gelman recounts Louis Harap being called before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). But the extent of ADL “collaboration” was to worry that HUAC’s inquiry would put Jews in a bad light, hardly evidence of “collaboration” between the ADL and McCarthy in the persecution of Harap. (You can read Harap’s testimony here).

If Gelman was searching for a non-elitist and anti-Zionist leftist, Harap was not it. Harap was the managing editor of the magazine, Jewish Life which was a communist publication. From its founding in 1946, and following Moscow’s line, Jewish Life was non-Zionist. Then, on May 14, 1947, the Soviet announced a new policy, explaining that Marxist dictates required, rather than rejected, a Jewish state in Palestine. Soon, the USSR was the staunchest defender of Israel on the international stage (here and here). In 1953, when Harap was forced to testify before HUAC, Jewish Life was a Zionist publication minimizing the number of Palestinian refugees and their suffering (see here and here). If Zionism is, by definition, settler colonialism, then the American left, at least as represented by Jewish Life, was just as guilty of it as American Zionists.

I am not trying to justify HUAC or its investigations into Harap, which were clearly an abuse of governmental authority and violation of Harap’s constitutional rights. The Harap incident, however, does not provide evidence Gelman needs to show that his persecution was part of the ADL suppressing an anti-Zionist leftist who was part of of “bottom up” movement.

Following Harap’s testimony, Gelman argues that in a meeting between the ADL and other Jewish organizations and HUAC the ADL “directly asked to work with HUAC” to “suppress the Jewish left and sharpen the propaganda value of the hearings” while “conspicuously casting aside concern for democratic processes” (p. 99). You can read the memorandum the ADL produced as a result of this meeting here and decide if Gelman accurately recounts it. In my read of it, it looks to me as if the ADL is trying to tame the committee to be more careful in its witnesses and how they are treated. They express particular frustration about antisemitism, asking the committee, “Why don’t Committee members say flatly, when a witness falsely charges anti-Semitism, that they regard anti-Semitism as being un-American and odious?” My read of the document doesn’t support the idea that the ADL is eager to join HUAC’s persecution of the reds. But, even if Gelman’s read is correct, there is no evidence that this particular meeting led to any significant cooperation between HUAC and the ADL.

Gelman claims that “this, too, was the context in which the ADL surveilled Martin Luther King, Jr., who was a target of McCarthy’s allegations of communism and a constant subject of FBI monitoring” (p. 98) a claim the ADL denies. Gelman cites a 1993 Village Voice1 article which makes the claim relying on Henry Schwartzschild who had worked for the ADL before leaving the organization finding them soft on civil rights. If the ADL was spying on King and did turn over their files to the FBI, what did they say? The FBI had extensive files on the ADL, which Gelman acknowledges (p. 14) and even more extensive files on King, but my admittedly quick perusal of them finds no evidence of ADL reports about King. If the ADL did report on King, perhaps it was to say that, despite what the American right was claiming, King was no communist.

“A year after the secret meeting more collaboration between the ADL and McCarthy came to light” Gelman claims (p. 99). The only other evidence of a “connection” (p. 98) between the ADL and McCarthy and HUAC that Gelman offers is the friendship between Arnold Forster, ADL’s chief investigator, and columnist Walter Winchell.2 “Through the ADL’s surveillance of the right, Forster regularly provided Winchell with material for his column (p. 98). It is not clear how supplying information on the right to a journalist aided governmental persecution of anti-racist or anti-Zionist leftists. Gelman provides no evidence that Forster aided Winchell’s or McCarthy’s anticommunist campaigns by naming suspected communists.3

There is no denying that the ADL communicated with the FBI. Forster himself applied for a job with the FBI in 1937 but was rejected because “he dressed poorly, did not appear resourceful, would probably not develop, and was not mentally alert” (p. 26). Forster never did turn against the FBI, but that does not necessarily translate to persecution of the left. For example, he sent an embarrassingly fawning letter to Hoover congratulating the director for the book, Masters of Deceit, for example (p. 16). In that book, Hoover had claimed that “Some of the most effective opposition to communism in the United States has come from Jewish organizations such as…the Anti-Defamation League” (p. 257). Hoover’s point was that Jewish organizations had denied that Bolshevism was a Jewish plot and argued that one could follow Judaism and subscribe to atheistic communism; typical Cold War claims.

3. The ADL and the Communists

Gelman analyzes the books published by the ADL in the 1950s and early 1960s but is not always fair in the offered descriptions. Gelman admits that Arnold Forster’s, the ADL’s chief investigator, 1950 book, A Measure of Freedom ” “conceived the threats to democracy almost exclusively from the right” (p. 102). The description would be more accurate by deleting “almost” because Forster’s book lists no threats to democracy from leftists at all. Hardly evidence of McCarthyism or a “fervent” anticommunism.

To show the ADL’s hostility to the left, Gelman focuses on Forster’s treatment of how rioters prevented two different performances by Paul Robeson. Forster noted that the US Attorney General listed sponsoring organization, the Civil Rights Congress as “subversive.” But Forster was clearly concerned that the rioters were simply using Robeson’s communism as a cover for their racism since “anti-Semitic and anti-Negro epithets were heard above the din” in the first riot.” In the second riot, “the anti-Semitic note which had been present in the first was even more evident this time” (p. 90).

Gelman’s description of Forster’s recounting is simply misleading:

Initially, Forster wrote, “some believed” that the anticommunist protest was “a healthy sign of Americanism.” As the rioting went on, though, it became more focused on anti-Jewish and anti-Black messages. Forster’s concern was that such organizing led to Jewish and Black people being “lumped together with the controversial Communism issue.”

Here’s what Forster wrote:

Reaction to both riots was mixed. Some believed that the attempts to prevent the concerts were a healthy sign of Americanism; others believed the “protests” to be a menace to democracy. The Anti-Defamation League recognized in these incidents an invasion of civil liberties destructive of the democratic fabric. (p. 90)

Undoubtedly racists and antisemites believed the riots were signs of “Americanism,” but Forster makes quite clear that the the racism was evident from the beginning and the ADL condemned the riots from the beginning. Gelman’s implication that the ADL thought the riots were “healthy Americanism” and that they only shifted from that position as the rioting progressed is simply false.

The next book Gelman examines is 1952’s The Troublemakers. Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein, the book’s authors, devoted an entire chapter to “Confusion from the Left” devoted to how “the Communist party works zealously among Negroes, Jews, and others in order to dramatize its alleged concern for human rights” (p. 218). For Forster and Epstein, the Communists, specifically the Civil Rights Congress (CRC) were disingenuous in their defenses of Willie McGee or the Trenton Six, criminal cases in which Black defendants were abused by a white supremacist criminal justice system.

Gelman correctly notes that “in both cases, the CRC had sought to defend against the racist contortions of justice. The ADL was outraged at the CRC’s involvement because the CRC described the prosecutions as a function of liberal capitalism, which provided no justice to Black workers” (p. 103). Gelman describes the insulting and dismissive language Forster and Epstein used to discuss the Black defendants which stripped them of any agency whatsoever. For the ADL, the defendants were “Black, poor, and gormless–and were ideological marks easily duped by communists and their offer of fundraising” (p. 104).

The heart of Gelman’s critique of the the ADL in these instances is how the communists publicized the cases: “the two cases,” Gelman writes, “had generated substantial international support for the defendants and outrage over Jim Crow laws” (p. 102). The ADL thought this publicity was evidence of the basic problem with the communist cause. In the midst of the international outrage, “millions had had all but forgotten the basic question of guilt or innocence” of Willie McGee (p. 219). The ADL’s logic was this: the communist cause was the overturning of liberal capitalism and not defending Willie McGee. Indeed, if Willie McGee were executed, that would just prove to the world that racial justice was impossible under capitalism. Therefore, the communists should not be trusted with the courtroom defense of Willie McGee, as his execution would serve their cause and his acquittal would damage it.

In the end, all that international publicity did not save Willie McGee from execution nor did it overturn liberal capitalism in the United States.

4. The ADL and the American Right

Gelman is absolutely correct that the ADL operated within the strictures of liberal capitalism. “The ADL is not an outlier in that sense: Civil rights advocacy has been the site of enormous contestation between groups who view the liberal state as a framework for justice, and others who contest it as foundationally racist” (p. 7). Left out of this formulation is the far right, which embraces an anti-democratic and overtly white supremacist social order. Gelman never really addresses, except in passing, the American far-right which the ADL saw as a real threat to American Jews and democracy. Is it really the case that there was no distinction between the ADL and those Americans we would label “conservatives” in the 1950s and early 1960s? Were they all rowing together? It does not seem so. Forster and Epstein’s 1964 book, Danger on the Right (unmentioned by Gelman) does not mention communism as a threat to the American political order. It does take on the anti-democratic and antisemitic right.

In the two decades after World War II, American anti-communists of the right despised the ADL. “The ADL, which is staffed by political Liberals, is notoriously unfriendly to anti-Communists of the tough stripe,” griped William F. Buckley, Jr. in 1962. The ADL was “arrogantly speaking as if in the name of New York Jewry in a series of filthy and defamatory lies” about “professional anti-Communists.” Buckley concluded that “it is better to be a professional anti-Communist…than a professional defamer.”4

If the ADL was so set against the communists, as Gelman maintains, what was Buckley’s problem with them? The answer may be in the ADL’s Primer on Communism. Gelman discusses this 1952 book briefly (p. 89) but, in my mind, misses two important distinctions it made between its anticommunism and that of the American right-wing. First, the ADL warned of how right-wing “opportunists trade on ignorance and misinformation, trying to mislead the nation into believing that American patriotism consists solely of hatred of Communism. Fight Communism, yes; but love Democracy more. The Bill of Rights and the Constitution were too dearly won to be surrendered to the Trojan Horses of totalitarianism” (p. 3). Second, the ADL pointed to a tradition that held “the working class could achieve its rightful place by peaceful means–through elections–and construct socialism gradually and democratically. These ideas became the cornerstone of democratic socialism as distinguished from communism” (p. 12).

For the American right, such views were heretical. For them, democracy was dangerous, had it not brought the socialistic New Deal? From the direct election of Senators to the enforcement of voting rights for disenfranchised Black Americans, the right consistently opposed any expansion of democratic rule. And socialism was nothing more than a step on “the road to serfdom.” For the right, unfettered capitalism was fine and needed to be protected from democracy. Gelman seems to ignore the differences between the ADL’s anticommunism and that of the right, differences that were seen as unbridgeable in the context of the time.

Buckley enjoyed an exaggerated reputation for drumming antisemitic rhetoric out of right-wing politics. If we are searching for an anti-Zionist, bottom up social movement in the postwar US, the antisemitic right fits that bill. For the truly antisemitic right, the ADL was nothing more than proof that the Jews were behind international communism and must be destroyed (see here, here, here, or here for a taste of this literature).

5. Anti-Zionism and the American Right

To find voices opposing Zionism in the US in the immediate postwar world, we need to look to the right, not the left. The American right opposed Zionism, not because they cared about Palestinians, but because they saw anti-Zionism as a necessary part of Cold War politics. And, of course, there was still more than a whiff of antisemitism in the American right.

Alfred M. Lilienthal, for example (cited by Gelman, pp. 106. 110-1) wrote an anti-Zionist book, What Price Israel in 1953. Lilienthal was no leftist opposing Israel simply because he opposed Zionism abuse of Palestinians. Much more important for him was Palestine as key weapon in the Cold War. He described the partitioning of Palestine as part of a Soviet conspiracy:

The US government demonstrated once more a complete lack of comprehension of Communist tactics. Why was the Kremlin permitting and even encouraging, the emigration of Jewish refugees to Israel from satellite countries?…These and other implications of Soviet Pro-Zionism were stressed in reports sent home by US diplomatic representatives in the field, but their warnings remained completely ignored in Washington. (p. 71)

Lilienthal also promoted one of the most popular antisemitic smears in the 1950s. Lilienthal argued that “That the Khazars are the lineal ancestors of Eastern European Jewry is a historical fact” (p. 222). The Khazars (sometimes “Chazars) were an ethnic group of people in Eastern Russia in the early medieval period. It had long been believed that the Khazars had, at some point in their history, converted to Judaism. In the twentieth century, antisemitic writers transformed the legend of the Jewish Khazars into an anti-Zionist and antisemitic weapon. In 1951’s Iron Curtain Over America, SMU professor John O. Beaty wrapped all of this up in one hateful package: “The Marxian program of drastic controls, so repugnant to the free western mind, was no obstacle to the acceptance of Marxism by many Khazar Jews.” After World War I, the German people were faced with a choice between “Communists, many of whose leaders were of Khazar stock” and Germans chose the native party and Adolf Hitler was elected Chancellor.” Roosevelt was led by the nose into World War II “for no formulated purpose beyond pleasing the dominant Eastern European element” who “regarded with complete equanimity, perhaps even with enthusiasm, the killing of as many as possible of the world-ruling and Khazar-hated race of ‘Aryans.’”

What Price Israel was published by Henry Regnery, most famous for publishing William F. Buckley, Jr’s God and Man at Yale. Lilienthal’s book was only one of the anti-Zionist books Regnery published. Some of these books, like Montgomery Belgion’s Victor’s Justice became foundational to the Holocaust denial movement.

Regnery’s output of anti-Zionist books paled in comparison to those put out by right-wing publisher, Devin-Adair, which published half a dozen books by European fascists seeking to reconstruct their movement after the war (p. 30). It also published two anti-Zionist books by Rabbi Elmer Berger (here and here). Berger was the executive director of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism (ACJ). Like the other Jewish organizations of the time, the ACJ was founded by German Jewish elites. Unlike other Jewish organizations the AJC did not come out firmly for civil rights and the end of Jim Crow in the 1950s (here).

Berger was more committed to Palestinian rights than most of the AJC and had an ongoing relationship (p. 177) with Fayez Sayegh who was the most powerful voice portraying Zionism as settler colonialism. Yet, Sayegh was no leftist. Sayegh warned, not just of the dangers of Soviet influence in Israel, but of Marxism embedded into Israeli life:

Communism is strongly entrenched not merely in the political life and institutions of Israel, but also in the economic-social structure of Israeli society. In fact, the political strength of Communism in Israel is derivative, reflecting the appeal of Communism as an ideology and a way of life to Israeli masses, and the influence of Marxist-Socialist teachings upon Israel’s patterns of socio-economic organization. (p. 7)

Conclusion

The logic of liberal capitalism does not seem to necessitate the policy outcomes Gelman wants to ascribe to it, specifically those of Zionism.The evidence for the ADL’s cooperation with the oppressive anticommunism of the government seems to be two meetings and a handful of communication between the FBI and the ADL. Gelman never provides examples of leftist anti-Zionist activities before 1967. And, Gelman seems unaware that anti-Zionism flourished in the far right of American politics who were much more committed to capitalist state-building than the ADL was which was precisely why the ADL was despised by the far right. If we want answers to why the ADL is the way it is today, the answers cannot be found before 1967.

I have not addressed Gelman’s concerns about how the ADL attacked Arab writers and activists as antisemites rather than anti-colonial activists who were trying to come to the defense of hundreds of thousands of refugee Palestinians from the Jewish state. That discussion will have to wait for another day.

Footnotes

  1. David Williams, “The Jewish Thought Police,” The Village Voice, July 27, 1993: 33-9. ↩︎
  2. The pedant in me wants to point out that McCarthy was a Senator and not a member of any House committee. ↩︎
  3. Gelman writes “Larry Ceplair writes that the ADL made anticommunism available as a platrom for fears, and opportunistic fear-mongering on a wide range of issues.” citing Ceplair, Larry. 2011. Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century America: A Critical History. Praeger, 100. I have not been able to find Ceplair making this claim about the ADL on that page or any place else in the book. ↩︎
  4. William F. Buckley Jr, “The Mad Attempt to Get Schwarz,” National Review, July 31, 1962; William F. Buckley Jr, “‘He Shall Not Be Heard’: The Anti-Defamation League,” National Review, June 19, 1962. ↩︎

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Libertarian Fictions

A drawing of a jester in a pointy hat. His body is a book and he is holding a book.
Because the world does not obey their ideology, libertarians prefer to send us to fictional places where their ideas actually work.

Libertarians love making stuff up. I don’t mean the counterfactual stories they tell when you point out some wonderful thing the government has supplied such as the eradication of smallpox, aka World’s Greatest Killer. Facts like that are always met with the response, “Well, a free market would have eradicated smallpox better, stronger, faster.” These fact-free assertions probably make them feel better, but I doubt anyone save the libertarian tribe takes them seriously. As Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway argue, the libertarian free market existed “precisely never. There has never been a time in human history when markets met these conditions, and there is no reason to think that such conditions could ever exist” (p. 418). Nor am I discussing the truly dangerous fiction they peddle to the world, such as the “Great Barrington Declaration” on the Covid pandemic or the fantasy of climate-change denialism, largely fueled by libertarians and their fossil-fuel-burning patrons. Or the “right” to poison themselves with raw milk. Thank goodness we took care of smallpox before the libertarian propaganda machine got going. “The solution is not vaccines but herd immunity!” “Um, actually, there is no proof that smallpox ever killed anyone!” or “It is my right to get a highly contagious disease with a 35% mortality rate! My body is my property!” No, my subject here is the actual make-believe world at the heart of libertarian ideology. If allowed to create a world in line with their politics, what would that world look like?”

Galt’s Gulch

A gulch in Rocky Mountain National Park in Colorado
An actual gulch in Rocky Mountain National Park in Colorado. I’m sure no one would notice if it suddenly went missing.

Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged (1957) is for those who think the problems of the world owe to the fact that people aren’t selfish enough and things would be better off if the good people just retreated to Galt’s Gulch and let a few billion people die as a result. These billions are “parasites” and, although Rand does not tell us directly, obviously must include the disabled and children. In Rand’s tale, those looters deserve to die.

Rand’s heroes are Übermenschen who retreat to a mysterious “Galt’s Gulch” hidden in the Colorado mountains and create a capitalist utopia. How does it remain hidden in a state where the federal government owns about a third of the real estate? Rand never explains this problem. In this place, these fierce individualists, beholden to no one but themselves, must take an “Galt’s Oath” named after cult leader founder John Galt to never give anything to anyone. What happens if someone, asserting their individuality does not take the oath? Rand never tells us. True individualism, it turns out is not thinking for yourself but acting and thinking exactly like Rand Galt does. You may want to feed your children and expect nothing in return, but that is a violation of the Galt’s Prime Directive so you should charge them or let them starve. If you choose to give them food, you aren’t an individualist. In Rand’s account, Galt’s Gulch is almost entirely populated by men. We can assume that the rugged individualist man returning home after working ruggedly individualistically is presented a bill by his ruggedly individualistic wife for doing laundry and vacuuming. I assume that she only prepared dinner for herself, and if he wants to eat, that will cost him.

What happens if a parasitic looter enters the gulch? Well, that’s impossible, you see because Galt created a mysterious shield that made the Gulch invisible. Does he give this protection to all inhabitants in violation of his oath? Rand never notes how he is paid for it, nor does she explain what would happen to a free-rider who doesn’t pay Galt yet obviously remains protected from the looters. There is no police force to enforce the (unwritten?) contract between Galt and the inhabitants.

In this capitalistic paradise, there are mineral mines and industrial production. What happens to the pollution caused by these enterprises? Rand is silent on this. Are children allowed (or required) to pay their way by working in a mine with no safety standards? Rand doesn’t say. Colorado has a semi-arid climate and the politics of water use are intense. Rand does not mention of where the water for all this comes from. Even a parasitic looter who works for the State of Colorado would notice the missing water. However, Rand just fiats away any real-world problems and hopes that no one notices them.

Despite her claims that her system is realistic and rational, Rand’s utopia is rife with contradictions and waves away any true problems of the world, “Rand’s utopia is not only inconsistent in description but simply not plausible in reality. Her idealized version of society is flawed in terms of sociological and economic and political laws and rests on a distorted view of human psychology” (p. 258)

Gumption Island

Largely forgotten today, Felix Morley (1894-1982) was a giant of the post-World War II libertarian movement. He won a Pulitzer for his editorial writing at the Washington Post, criticizing Roosevelt and the New Deal. After World War II, Morley wrote regular columns for Nation’s Business and Barron’s Weekly, co-founded the conservative newspaper Human Events, and enjoyed regular broadcast gigs on radio and television:

Morley was also on the advisory board of Spiritual Mobilization, a libertarian organization that promoted free-market ideas to the clergy, and he was a founding member of the Mont Pererin Society. The libertarian Volker Fund awarded Morley the William Volker Distinguished Service Award in 1961.

In 1956, Morley published Gumption Island, a novel he described as a “political fantasy,” in which Gibson Island, where Morley made his home was transformed into a libertarian utopial. Morley wanted to use his novel to both explain his ideal political order and to to explore race relations, “Knowing this island and its people, both white and black, I have long speculated how they would react, individually and collectively, if thrown into a ‘state of nature” (Morley to J.H. Gipson, March 19, 1954, Box 33 in Morley Papers, Hoover Presidential Library). Much more than his non-fiction, Gumption Island reveals the racism underneath Morley’s political thought.

In the novel, the Soviets drop a “Q-bomb” which sends a small island of homeowners back to the age of the dinosaurs and they must create a livable political order. There are two notable aspects of Morley’s politics, as revealed in the book that bear mentioning.

First, Jews controlled money and banking on the island. Albert Adler, one of the island’s few Jews, argued that money had to be fixed to the gold standard to prevent the manipulation of currency by government. He argued,’ For good historical reasons, every intelligent Jew understands the significance of gold. As a matter of fact, between ourselves, I’m wearing a beltful of double eagles at this minute. I’ve never travelled anywhere without them, since 1932. It’s funny to think that now I’ve carried these five hundred gold dollars back fifty million years” (92).  Finally, Adler lends the community his gold with the guarantee that there will be no manipulation of the gold reserve and that he and another person will be in complete control of the bank and have the sole power to appoint their own successors. Later in the novel, a motion is made to force the bank to pay the profits of the bank to the island’s Director of Finance. Adler blocks the move by telling the islanders, “If that motion is carried…I may feel it necessary to withdraw the gold reserve, which is not an asset of the bank, but a personal loan of my private property.” Morley thus recreates the stereotype of the money-grubbing Jew, the sole control of the economy.

Second, Morley wrote all African-American characters in a minstrel show dialect, even though by the 1950s such a dialect was increasingly recognized as reflecting an ugly racist stereotype. White immigrant characters, such as the Polish immigrant who connived with the Soviets to set the Q-bomb, as well as a Russian pilot who had been thrown into the past with the Gumption Island residents, were presented as speaking unaccented English. While listening to the white islanders discussing Plato, Bill Jefferson, portrayed as a leader in the African-American community, thinks to himself, “I guess…that Ah jes’ ain’t intellectualy competent. With all this yak-yak, they’s clean forgot Ah’s supposed to pick up a load o’ wood fo’ the hospital.” After he returned to the African-American community and reported what he had seen and heard in the white home, they agreed not to participate in governing the island. As one character put it, “I guess we got to leave it to the white folks to give the orders…so long as they treat us decent.” In Morley’s libertarian social order, African Americans happily give up any political power because they realize their own incapacity to govern.

In the 1950s libertarians imagined their utopias as places where pollution didn’t exist, where children were “free” to work or starve, and where “individualism” meant surrendering your free choice to act altruistically. A place where the Jewish racial trait of hoarding gold allowed them to control the economy, and African Americans were happy in their servitude. You and I might call such places nightmares, but libertarians call them paradise.

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Adventure Capitalism: Exit, Stage Right

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Book Cover for Adventure Capitalism: A History of Libertarian Exit, from the Era of Decolinization to the Digital Age

I love a good heist story. You know the ones, our heroes are planning a seemingly impossible task. They are the good guys, forced to operate outside the law for unjust reasons. The team is always composed of specialists: you have the getaway driver, you have the cat burgler, you have the muscle, you have the confidence grifter, you might have someone working on the inside, feeding them inside information. Nowadays, you also have the hacker who can break inside any computer system. They are all the best of the best, and despite their tremendous odds, they emerge victorious at the end of the tale. One of my favorite shows was Leverage (and its continuation, Leverage: Redemption) which told such a story every week. It was all rip-roaring good fun.

One of the showrunners for Leverage was John Rogers who has a very successful career in show biz, and is the author of this famous quotation:

Here are two novels that can change a bookish fourteen-year old’s life: The Lord of the Rings and Atlas Shrugged. One is a childish fantasy that often engenders a lifelong obsession with its unbelievable heroes, leading to an emotionally stunted, socially crippled adulthood, unable to deal with the real world. The other, of course, involves orcs.

This brings us to the amazing book, Raymond B. Craib‘s Adventure Capitalism,which is like a heist story. Except for the heist crew being hyper-competent adventurers, the crew is the Three Stooges entranced by Ayn Rand. Instead of pretending to hurt each other, Larry, Moe, and Curly hurt other people. But, like the Stooges, Craib’s crew utterly failed in what they attempted.

The center of Adventure Capitalism is Michael Oliver, a Lithuanian Jew who was the only member of his family to survive the Holocaust and came to the United States. Like many refugee Jews of his generation, Oliver was attuned to the dangers of totalitarian governance. Unlike most of his cohort, he did nothing to ensure “it can’t happen here,” Oliver chose a different path. Oliver was “worried that his adopted country in the 1960s teetered on the brink of totalitarianism. He thus saw exit as the most viable way to survive and thrive, and he spent much of the decade of the 1970s traversing the globe in the hopes of establishing a new country.” Oliver and company’s attempts to create a libertarian paradise. During the early 1970s, Oliver et al. attempted to dredge an island in the Southern Pacific region. The attempt was quickly terminated by Tonga, who understood the reef upon which the “island” was to be erected as their own. A second effort, aided by well-armed mercenaries, failed in the Abaco region of Bahamas. Yet a third, this time in what is now Vanuatu, failed again, despite backing from libertarians such as John Hospers and the US Libertarian party and buckets of Oliver’s money. Such efforts continue today under the leadership of folks such as Milton Friedman’s grandson in the seasteading movement. Craib relates this with extensive archival research and a storyteller’s knack for writing page-turning prose.

For me, Adventure Capitalism underscores the moral bankruptcy of libertarian exiteers. Randian libertarians, Craib argues, “seem indifferent to the general public and express disdain for democratic politics.” Community action, voting, organizing, advocating, and efforts to improve society, none of which were for Oliver; rather, he adopted Brave Sir Robin’s strategy of “Run Away! Run Away! Craib gives no indication that Oliver was concerned about those he left behind in the United States being crushed by the hobnailed boot of totalitarianism. Craib notes that Oliver’s effort to establish a libertarian paradise was a “moral experiment.” Oliver’s moral message was clear: The proper response to the rise of totalitarianism, such as that in Germany in the 1920s, was to have enough money to abandon those fighting against the Nazis to the concentration camps. Present-day libertarians think that “what happened to Oliver’s family during World War II” means that any “Quests to evade such ends are worth respectful consideration.” In my mind, this shows the immorality at the heart of libertarianism: better to “evade” Nazi governance than to prevent Nazi governance. What about those who lack the resources to exit? “Let the looters die” seems to be the libertarian answer. Reaching this conclusion seems inevitable after any “respectful consideration” of libertarian exit strategies.

Since Oliver failed in his attempts to create his utopia, we are left to wonder what life in such a place would be like. Other than vague promises about “freedom” libertarian exiteers are very vague about life in these supposed utopias. Rand never let us lesser beings inside Galt’s Gulch for example. Atlas Shrugged is, of course, fiction. For a better fictional account of such a libertarian society, I highly recommend Naomi Kritzer‘s Liberty’s Daughter. Read it in conjunction with Quinn Slobodian‘s Crack-Up Capitalism: Market Radicals and the Dream of a World Without Democracy to get more information about these capitalist “paradises” than you’ll ever get from the libertarian exiteers.

Craib details indigenous understandings of land, ownership, and kinship that cannot be reduced to the Lockean understanding of “property rights” that libertarians claim to be universal. The human experience is richer than that, and in, as Craig’s subtitle has it, the “era of decolonization’ the formerly colonized were boldy asserting their alternative understanding of humanity’s relationship to the planet. Part of the problem the exiteers face is that their idea of unoccupied land just waiting for them to “mix their labor” with to make it their own private property has always been a lie. People are living on it. Those people have their own ideas about their relationship with land, which might not match those of libertarians. Hence, Oliver’s need to hire mercenary soldiers to create his private society based on the “non-aggression” principle of libertarians. That anyone finds the libertarian exiteers moral actors seems beyond belief to me. Go read Adventure Capitalism to see their moral bankruptcy.

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Black Liberation Through the Marketplace: Another miss by libertarians

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Cover of Black Liberation Through the Marketplace: Hope, Heartbreak, and the Promise of America By Rachel S. Ferguson and Marcus M. Witcher

Previous readers of this content may recall my main argument: the libertarian “freedom movement” failed to address racism in the post-World War II United States and often used libertarian arguments to hinder progress for African Americans. However, after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, these freedom advocates surprisingly became focused on issues of racism, particularly “affirmative action” and “quotas.” In an attempt to reconcile their past, libertarians have since attempted to rebrand their “classical liberalism” as always being opposed to racism. These efforts never succeed because the stories they tell are simply unsupportable.

Comes now Black Liberation Through the Marketplace, a book by libertarians, Rachel. S. Ferguson and Marcus M Witcher (FW). It is published by Emancpation Books, which announces itself in this way:

A spectre is stalking American newsrooms and publishing houses: the spectre of angry woke leftists aggressively seeking to dictate the range of acceptable viewpoints on a wide range of issues. This campaign of mob censorship not only runs counter to our cherished national traditions of free thought and speech, it especially limits the expression of independent views by writers of color who may dissent from the majority opinion of their group.

OK then….

FW assert that classical liberalism’s principles of individualism, property rights, free markets, and the rule of law are inherently antiracist, while accounts of the rise of racialized chattel slavery and capitalism are mistaken. But they grapple with little of the enormous literature on these subjects. FW write as if the 1619 project is the last word on these subjects rather than a project meant for public consumption. and Ed Baptist’s decade-old The Half that Never Was is the only book on the topic. The authors assure us that the thesis of “the inextricable association of capitalism with slavery has been roundly criticized by experts as being woefully unfamiliar with the economic literature on slavery” (p. 32). Well, sure. and those experts’ work has been rebutted in turn: historical inquiry is complicated and FW misleadingly write as if this were a settled controversy. More worryingly, they simply act as if some sort of economic calculation has settled the matter rather than even attempting to address the enormous literature on racist ideology and how many classical liberals, John Locke pre-eminently, justified racial conquest and slavery in the language of property rights and freedom.

FW correctly notes that at the beginning of the 20th century, Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois were both striving for Black liberation, albeit through different paths (p. 174). Both leaders sought emancipation from American racial oppression, with Washington believing that economic advancement would lead to white Americans acknowledging Black financial power, thereby granting full legal and political rights to Black citizens. Du Bois, on the other hand, believed that political and legal rights were essential for economic advancement, as without them, Black citizens would be powerless to protect their gains.

While FW argues that the market can lead to Black liberation, they overlook the fact that full political and legal rights are crucial for this to happen, and, more tellingly never tell the reader that the “classical liberals” in the post-World War II US opposed extending those political and legal rights to Black Americans. FW’s own evidence proves that even with economic advancement, the market cannot eradicate racism on its own. Between the end of the Civil War and World War I, FW tell a tale of enormous economic advancement. “Simple competition” meant that “White planters had to choose between their preference for wealth and their preference for discrimination” and found that choosing discrimination had severe economic costs. But wait, then FW tell us that “market forces forced whites to turn to the political realm to maintain supremacy” (p. 79). This means that even though “Black Americans tripled their per capita income by 1914” (p. 80), political and legal equality never emerged through market mechanisms to protect those gains as Washington argued they would. This is the problem with thinking that the market would “solve” racism: there is never any timetable offered, no indication of how long Black citizens would have to remain disenfranchised and suffer discrimination when that happy day arrives when white people will finally recognize them as fellow human beings because, now, they are finally rich enough to be granted full citizenship. This is hardly good enough.

FW highlights the brutal violence experienced by Black individuals during the first half of the 20th century. However, they fail to mention that several devastating massacres against Black people were motivated by the economic progress that was supposed to guarantee their safety in a market economy. In the 1906 Atlanta massacre, the white “mob destroyed Black-owned businesses and homes and targeted the historically Black colleges and universities in the area. A barbershop owned by Alonzo Herndon, one of the nation’s first African American millionaires, was vandalized.” The Tulsa race massacre specifically targeted “Black Wall Street” an important hub of Black economic success. Far from protecting Black people, economic power often made them targets for white violence precisely because Black people lacked the legal and political protections that economic advancement was supposed to bring in its wake. Libertarians frequently assert that the state’s primary function is to safeguard private property. Nevertheless, historical evidence demonstrates that it only defends the property of those who already possess the legal and political clout to demand protection. The market and property, absent the mechanisms of government, cannot survive, contra libertarian claims to the contrary.

In 1955, at the start of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, FW note that “all previous attempts to use Black economic power to end segregation and discrimination had failed” (p. 192). Many things had changed since Washington’s death four decades earlier. The growth of Black wealth in Black social spaces such as churches and lodges had, as FW note, meant that there was a “powerful foundation” for Black protest “built over the preceding seven decades, of Black businesses” (p. 192).

But wait, does that mean that Booker T. Washington and FW are right? That the market did, indeed, make strides toward getting Black legal and political rights. No, not really. It isn’t that the market forced white people to finally concede that Black people were real people. It was that Black people stood up and demanded their full rights as citizens. Nothing was given, it was taken. That Black economic advancement, and tight social networks, made it possible for such demands to be made does not equate with “the market” eliminating Jim Crow.

Du Bois, the NAACP, and the Civil Rights Movement supported of Black economic advancement, but the opposite was not the case. Libertarians, who advocated for market solutions to racism, opposed any political or legal solutions to racism. Libertarians believed that Fair Employment Practices were an unjustified infringement of property rights, and they opposed any requirement for owners of public accommodations to stop racially discriminating. They also argued that the federal government had no business interfering with states administering public education, even if that meant maintaining racial segregation. Libertarians sometimes even supported segregationists who claimed that the 14th Amendment was illegally adopted, thereby relieving state governments of their obligation to provide equal protection of the law. When Virginia proposed a voucher system to maintain racial segregation in private schools, libertarians like James Buchanan and Milton Friedman were eager to provide their support for the project.

The core of the libertarian opposition was what Albert Hirschman called the “perversity thesis” which holds that any attempt to cure a social ill will only exacerbate the very problem it is meant to solve. Of course, if the perversity thesis were true, Jim Crow should have eliminated racial discrimination rather than viciously enforce it, something libertarians never considered. Libertarians consistently argued that implementing a Fair Employment law would intensify racial tension. Libertarians believed that to combat racism, it was necessary to change the minds of racists through persuasion, rather than relying on legal action, holding this belief even as mountains of social scientific evidence against it accumulated. The entire civil rights movement held that legal and political changes could precede attitude change, a view that libertarians simply view as “coercion” rather than freedom and equality. No matter how much retrofitting libertarians attempt to make to their central ideas, the record is clear that their “freedom movement” inhibited this country’s battle against its own racism.

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Race Scientists Ask You Believe in Impossible Things

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The White Queen and Alice from Alice Through the Looking Glass
“I can’t believe that!” said Alice.
“Can’t you?” the Queen said in a pitying tone. “Try again: draw a long breath, and shut your eyes.”
Alice laughed. “There’s no use trying,” she said: “one can’t believe impossible things.”
“I daresay you haven’t had much practice,” said the Queen. “When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.

When racial hereditarian researchers tell you they are objective scientists only concerned with the rigorous scientific pursuit of truth, what else do you need to believe to accept that claim? What are the markers of an open-minded researcher who is completely nonpartisan politically? We would expect that person to be careful not to entangle themselves and their research with those who are pursuing political ends; those who seek to use the mask of science to advance specific policy options and social orders. We would not expect them to draw upon political writers as authorities for their scientific claims. We would not expect them to collaborate with people pushing a political agenda.

In a recent article, Michael Woodley, Matthew A. Sarraf & Mateo Peñaherrera-Aguirre write that they believe the Holocaust happened. They also want to make clear that They are “hereditarians” not racists. Nor are they eugenicists. Oh, and Woodley especially wants us to know that he had nothing to do with his work being cited by the Buffalo shooter who killed African Americans in the name of racial purity. (I know what you are thinking, “Where does Woodley stand on the existence of Bigfoot?” Well, he appears to think the jury’s still out on that question).

Of course, anyone who must take to print to deny they are Holocaust deniers, a scientific racist, a eugenicist an inspiration for a racist terrorist might want to stop and think about why they are so characterized by so many people. An obvious question is, “Maybe it is me?” It appears that the authors never ask themselves that question. They portray themselves as objective scientists and their many, many critics must simply misunderstand the nature of science and objective inquiry because they are so blinded by “leftist” ideology. To believe their claims, you must believe a host of other impossible claims they use to support it.

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The Big Myth: Fictions of Free Market Fundamentalism

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Cover of The Big Myth: How American Business Taught us to Loathe Government and Love the Free Market by Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway

According to the American Economic Association:

Economics can be defined in a few different ways. It’s the study of scarcity, the study of how people use resources and respond to incentives, or the study of decision-making. It often involves topics like wealth and finance, but it’s not all about money. Economics is a broad discipline that helps us understand historical trends, interpret today’s headlines, and make predictions about the coming years.

If that’s how professional economists define their field, a question should arise in your mind: what does economics have to do with human freedom? To understand human freedom, other fields of study seem to be more relevant: philosophy, sociology, political science, or even history. In their new book, Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, The Big Myth: How American Business Taught Us to Loathe Government and Love the Free Market (read an excerpt here), tell us why Americans tend to think that “freedom” is best addressed by economics. As the title indicates, it is the result of over a century of mythmaking funded by businesses, corporations, and very, very wealthy people. It is the Big Myth.*

The book is a critique of the extensive public relations campaign that “market fundamentalists” have been conducting in the United States for over a century. Oreskes and Conway have nothing against markets and give credit to them where credit is due. The difference between them and the “market fundamentalists” they critique is that:

Contemporary conservatives, libertarians, and market fundamentalists are not really defending capitalism, even if they think they are. They are defending a certain idea of capitalism, a vision of growth and innovation by unfettered markets where government just gets out of the way. (p. 13)

The idea of the perfect, unfettered market, however, existed, “precisely never. There has never been a time in human history when markets met these conditions, and there is no reason to think that such conditions could ever exist” (p. 418). Nonetheless, the utopian vision of a “free market” has been invoked time and time again against any kind of governmental oversight or regulation of businesses.

Market fundamentalists can only advocate for unfettered markets by ignoring the role government has always played in capitalism. For example, free market fundamentalists make much of what they call the “Great Enrichment:” the great growth in wealth beginning in the 19th century. I’ve pointed out in this space before how slavery, not libertarian “freedom” was responsible for a great deal of that wealth (see here and here). Oreskes and Conway point out that much of the geographic expansion that fed the “Great Enrichment” came from the displacement of American Indians (pp. 172-85, 226). The idea that European settlers could simply take the land of indigenous Americans comes from John Locke’s idea of “property rights” and has been endorsed recently by conservative pundit, Jonah Goldberg. No market fundamentalist idea is every truly dead.

Oreskes and Conway also document the rise of industrial technology, the “American System of Manufactures” which allowed interchangeable parts in machinery through the development of machine tools. This technological revolution allowed for the mass production of goods on a scale never before possible. The revolution in industry resulted from the federal government’s investment in the problem: “It took nearly fifty years–what would have been an inconceivable period of research and development for a private corporation in the nineteenth century (or today for that matter)–but once it was achieved, it revolutionized manufacturing” (p. 124). When confronted with well-documented histories of governmental involvement with the creation of wealth and advancing capitalism, market fundamentalists like Milton Friedman, just ignore it, or worse, lie about it (p. 275). The market fundamentalists create a fictional past to suit their ideological predispositions and, more importantly, the ideological demands of those paying them.

Details on page two.

*Full disclosure: Erik Conway and I are graduates from the same PhD program and had the same advisor. He’s a friend. Oreskes and Conway flattered me with a brief mention in the acknowledgments for a tiny bit of help finding some hard-to-locate publications. I have admired and taught their previous book, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming as well as the related documentary. Additionally, I have used Oreskes’s book, Why Trust Science? as a text in my “Science and Public Policy” class since its release a few years ago.

Hayek Versus Hayek

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It turns out I have more thoughts on Andrew Koppelman’s new book, Burning Down the House. In my previous post, I dealt with Hayek and racism. Here I focus on Koppeman’s claim that a sharp distinction can be drawn between the crude and radical libertarianism of Murray Rothbard and the sophisticated and moderate libertarian libertarianism of F.A. Hayek. It was Rothbard’s fanatical opposition to any version of the welfare state or regulatory control of businesses that libertarians are embracing today, Koppelman claims. By abandoning such absolutist claims and embracing Hayekian balanced approach to governance, libertarianism can be a useful guide for our future. Koppelman is correct that a clear distinction can be drawn between Rothbard and Hayek but errs in thinking Hayekian thought is not responsible for the libertarian embrace of current policies that Koppelman deplores. I show that Koppelman misunderstands the argumentative strategies employed by today’s libertarians to oppose reasonable regulations on business and the expansion of the welfare state. These strategies are better described as Hayek’s than Rothbard’s. Also, I show that Koppelman’s main intellectual opponent is Hayek himself, who consistently opposed policies that Koppelman claims Hayek’s logic should endorse.

To begin, I will explore Hayek’s argumentative strategy for evaluating a given governmental action.

Frontpiece of Cato's Letters, Vol. 1
The Cato Institute, named after Cato’s Letters was founded by Rothbard and Koch in 1977

For Hayek, Koppelman argues, state action could be justified through cost/benefit analysis: does the proposed action’s benefits outweigh the cost? If so, the action is justified, if not the action is not justified. But that description, which reduces Hayek to the kind of everyday cost/benefit analysis that every policymaker presumably employs in some form and misses what makes a particular calculation “Hayekian.”

What makes a cost-benefit analysis Hayekian is that Hayek demanded that state intervention in the economy shouldered very strong probative obligations “Hayek’s view did not entail minimum government. It rather imposed strict conditions on intervention in the economy” p. 15). For Hayek, the market enjoyed a strong presumption of efficiency and, in order to justify State action, the government should shoulder a quite heavy burden of proof to show that the benefits of taking action outweigh the costs imposed. The state may act in “market failure can be shown.” (p. 177). Koppelman argues that Hayek, read properly, allowed for reasonable regulation of economic activity in order to protect the public good and a welfare state provided those measures met very stringent evidentiary requirements showing them to provide net benefits to society. For Hayek, that could include things like a guaranteed minimum income to provide for basic human needs. These reasonable measures are viewed as anti-libertarian by today’s libertarian right, who are committed to Rothbard’s dogmatic views of private property which forbids such measures. For Rothbardian thinkers, taxation is always theft, state action is always coercive, and the market will always provide for human needs better than the government–views Hayek rejected according to Koppelman. Koppelman concludes, “Hayek’s reasoning thus yields a moderate, pro-capitalism, pro-free trade philosophy that embraces the modern regulatory and welfare state so long as it does its job properly’ (p. 71).

Well, now. Before we all go jumping into bed together, let’s ask ourselves a basic question: do Hayek’s views provide the guidance necessary to actually govern in the way that Koppelman claims it did in the past and should in the future? If the question of state action turns on how much evidence is required to overcome the presumption the market enjoys, for Hayekians, that means the evidence needs to be very good and there needs to be a lot of it. But who makes the determination that the evidence is sufficient? How is the evidence gathered and weighted? What counts as a “cost” or a “benefit?” Those are the kind of questions that need answers before a political theory can guide policy.

More importantly, since there is a strong presumption against state action in Hayek’s formulation, those opposing regulations or a welfare state do not need to “win” any particular argument about such actions. They merely need to set the burden of proof high enough such that it is difficult, or perhaps impossible to meet, as Richard Gaskins has shown. Schematically, the argument looks like this:

  • Make the opposing advocate shoulder the burden of proof.
  • Set the standards for meeting the burden of proof very high.
  • Claim that the opposing advocate has not met the burden of proof either by claiming the available evidence does not meet the burden of proof OR that the available evidence does shows the costs outweigh the benefits.

In fact, this is precisely the strategy employed by the“neo-Hayekians” who are homed at “intellectually serious policy-wonk institutions such as George Mason University and the Cato Institute” (p. 110) to forestall the kind of “modern regulatory and welfare state” Koppelman claims they should be embracing.

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F.A. Hayek and the False Promise of a Racially Just Libertarianism

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The cover of Andrew Koppelman's book, Burning Down the House: How Libertarian Philosophy was Corrupted by Delusion and Greed

In his new book, Burning Down the House: How Libertarian Philosophy was Corrupted by Delusion and Greed, Andrew Koppelman, the John Paul Stevens Professor of Law at Northwestern University attempts to rescue libertarianism from itself by centering the work of Freidrich A. Hayek, one of the most distinguished economists of the twentieth century. Toward the end of the book, Koppelman discusses Barry Goldwater “who admired and sometimes quoted Hayek…After he had the [1964 Republican] nomination [for the Presidency], Goldwater (himself no racist) voted against the Civil Rights Act on libertarian grounds: ‘the freedom to associate means the same thing as the freedom not to associate.'” (p. 188). On the following page, he writes, “Reagan succeeded in shifting American politics–and American understandings of liberty, in Hayekian direction. He used the word freedom in his speeches more than any president before or since” (p, 189). Nestled between those two sentences is this one: “Libertarianism in all the forms we have examined is firmly opposed to racism. We have seen no trace of it in any of the arguments we have surveyed” (p. 189). That Koppelman cannot see any “trace of racism” in Goldwater parroting standard segregationist lines to oppose the Civil Rights Act or in Reagan’s “War on Drugs,” environmental racism, and generally throttling any antiracism in the Republican party underscores the flaws of his analysis of the history of libertarian ideology and racism.

In some respects Koppelman tells a story that parallels Matt Zwolinksi & John Tomasi’s The Individualists. Both books tell a story of libertarian ideas that, somehow, lost their way. What was once a philosophy that championed freedom for all became, or is in danger of becoming, a philosophy of reaction and repression. For Zwolinski & Tomasi it was a reactionary turn the movement took in the second half of the twentieth century. For Koppelman, the problem is similar: it is that libertarianism has misunderstood its own founding ideas; for him, libertarians are too entranced by the views of Ayn Rand and Murray N. Rothbard instead of F.A. Hayek, libertarianism’s true founder because “American libertarianism began with Hayek” (p. 7).

One reason Koppelman argues that Hayek is properly viewed as the founder of libertarianism is that Koppelman believes that nearly every viable option in today’s political landscape opposes the planned economy that Hayek feared. “Excerpt for a politically impossible fringe, the American left aims for a generous welfare state–more generous than the present one–in the context of capitalism” (p. 4-5). Yes, even Bernie Sanders (p. 5, 35). According to Koppelman, “The ideas of Hayek, valuing markets because they promise a better life for everyone are today commonplace in the Democratic Party” (p. 13). For Koppelman, the enemies of libertarianism come from the right, not the left. Libertarian ideas are threatened by Republican embrace of “Christian fundamentalism and Trumpian racist, xenophobic nationalism” (p. 12).The question then becomes, does Hayekian libertarianism give Koppelman the tools he needs to combat racism? To answer that question, I will examine how Hayek fits into the history of the relationship between libertarian thought and racist thought. Despite attempts at “revisionist” history from twenty-first century libertarians, the libertarian tradition they’ve inherited was either an active participant in building a racist society or passive observers of it. Looking to libertarian ideology to somehow be an active warrior against racism at this late date might be possible, but to do so libertarians need to honestly evaluate their own past.

Page Two will explore these difficulties.

Another Distorted History of Libertarianism and Racial Justice

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Some religious traditions, most famously, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, practice the Baptism of the Dead. In this practice, the Church baptizes a living person who is acting as a proxy for a deceased person in order to ensure that that deceased person gains entry into Heaven. Often this practice has met with vigorous objections from leaders of other faiths who find the practice disrespectful to their own faiths.

When libertarians write the history of their ideology in matters of race they tend toward a similar practice. Historical figures are torn from their contexts and declared “libertarians” in order to, metaphorically, get libertarians into the Kingdom of Free Market Heaven. Often the historical figures are a bizarre hodgepodge of folks, usually chosen more for their appealing views on racial justice than on their advocacy of views normally thought of as the centerpieces of libertarian thought such as the non-aggression principle, capitalism, property rights, or strict individualism. The most egregious example of libertarians trying retroactively baptize a historical figure as one of their own is when they try to claim that Martin Luther King, Jr., noted socialist, was a libertarian (examples: here, here, and here).

In their new book The Individualists: Radicals, Reactionaries, and the Struggle for the Soul of Libertarianism, Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi know better than to try to retroactively enroll MLK as a libertarian, indeed, they point out that many libertarians object to MLK’s ideas (pp. 220, 358). These are real scholars publishing with Princeton University Press, not some blogger on the internet like some people around here. On the other hand, Zwolinski and Tomasi cite a whole lot of bloggers in their chapter on “Racial Justice and Individualism” which is my focus, so perhaps the playing field is more even than I thought.

Zwolinski and Tomasi seem well aware of philosopher Stephen Toulmin’s adage that “Definitions are like belts. The shorter they are, the more elastic they need to be. A short belt reveals nothing about its wearer: by stretching it can be made to fit almost anybody…Yet the hope of hitting on some definition which is at one and the same time satisfactory and brief dies hard” (p. 18). They opt for “satisfactory” rather than “brief” and devote their first chapter to answering the question, “What is Libertarianism?” and draw careful distinctions among “classical liberals,” “neoliberalism,” and “Strict libertarians.” That last category is itself comprised of deontic libertarians, who are guided entirely by inflexible principles and consequentialist libertarians who “evaluates the consequences not of specific policies but of general principles and retains its commitment to those principles even if they (seem to) fail in particular instances” (p. 16). As an aside: keep an eye on that parenthetical “seem to,” it will become important later. Zwolinski & Tomasi often label failures of libertarianism, no matter how big or well documented as seemings. Libertarianism can only “seem” to fail, not actually fail.

Their summary of libertarianism gives us this:

Libertarianism is best understood as a cluster concept. We see libertarianism as a distinctive combination of six key commitments: property rights, negative liberty, individualism, free markets, a skepticism of authority, and a belief in the explanatory and normative significance of spontaneous order. (p. 6)

It is the jockeying among those various elements that make libertarianism so slippery a concept: just which element should be weighted the most, for example? It is also these differing commitments that seem to open the door to reactionary libertarianism. In Zwolinski & Tomasi’s history, libertarianism grew out of an absolute commitment to individualism and negative liberty first embaced by certain 19th century figures’ opposition to slavery. In the twentieth century libertarianism took a reactionary turn in defense of the status quo, and is now embroiled in controversy over which path the “Liberty Movement” will take here in the 21st century: radical or reactionary? (Spoiler alert: they don’t tell you).

I will focus on Chapter 7, “Racial Justice and Individualism” since that is the chapter that is most relevant to my work and expertise. Buckle up and go to page 2.

South Carolina wants to ban genetic science

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A poem published right after South Carolina started the Civil War declaring they did it for “freedom.”

South Carolina, despite their claims to contrary, has never been a state eager to embrace racial justice. The latest example of the state’s regressive racial thinking is Proposed Bill SC S0424. Like many states ruled by conservatives, the Palmetto State’s legislature is in a tizzy about what they think Critical Race Theory (CRT) is. Because those spreading the moral panic about CRT lie about it and the white legislators who listen to them don’t really care about what CRT actually, many legislatures are proposing the “banning” the teaching of CRT. South Carolina has proposed legislation that is the perfect exemplar of the deep and eagerly embraced ignorance of the anti-CRT crowd. Proposed Bill SC S0424 reads, in part:

(9) an individual must be compelled to affirm, accept, adopt, profess, or adhere to concepts, forms of language, or definitions not firmly and widely established, empirically or scientifically accurate, or that are controversial or theoretical, such as:

         (a) gender theory, including nonbinary pronouns or honorifics;

         (b) unconscious or implicit bias; or

         (c) that race or biological sex are social constructs;

I’m going to leave aside the gender issues in the post and focus on the idea that race is a social construct. It would seem that South Carolina wants to ban ideas like this one:

In one word, the term race is only a product of our mental activities, the work of our intellect, and outside all reality. Science had need of races as hypothetical limits, and these “products of art,” to use Lamarck’s expression, have become concrete realities for the vulgar. Races as irreducible categories only exist as fictions in our brains. They exist in us but not outside us. We can never sufficiently insist on this fact, which is elementary and undeniable to all truly scientific minds and to those desirous above all of ascertaining the truth.

That quotation is not from some wild-eyed “Cultural Marxist” but from French writer, Jean Finot’s book Race Prejudice published in English in 1907. In the subsequent century, Finot has been proven correct, “truly scientific minds” know that “races as irreducible categories only exist as fictions in our brains.” If South Carolina had its way, its schoolchildren would not be taught the best genetic science of the 21st century.

On the next page, I’ll explain why.